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Evaluating Pooled Evidence from the
Reemployment Bonus Experiments
Abstract
Social experiments conducted in Pennsylvania and Washington tested the effect of offering
Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants a cash bonus for rapid reemployment. This paper
combines data from the two experiments and uses a consistent framework to evaluate the
experiments and determine with greater certainty the extent to which a reemployment bonus can
affect economic outcomes. Bonus offers in each of the experiments generated statistically
significant but relatively modest reductions in UI receipt. Since the estimated impacts on UI
receipt were modest, the reemployment bonuses did not generate the UI savings necessary to pay
for administering and paying the bonuses. Hence, contrary to earlier findings from a bonus
experiment conducted in Illinois, findings from the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments
strongly suggest that a reemployment bonus is not a cost-effective method of speeding the
reemployment of UI claimants.
Paul T. Decker
Mathematica Policy Research
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Washington, D.C. 20024
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Evaluating Pooled Evidence from the
Reemployment Bonus Experiments
I.

INTRODUCTION

The federal-state Unemployment Insurance (UI) system provides partial earnings
replacement to established labor force members who are involuntarily unemployed and actively
seeking work. Since UI beneficiaries receive money while not working, the UI system has the
potential of prolonging spells of unemployment.1 Historically, the program has used
administrative work-search requirements and referrals to the Job Service to promote rapid
reemployment and to limit UI receipt. In recent years policymakers have examined whether
additional services, including monetary incentives, can be used to encourage claimants to gain
reemployment sooner. The monetary incentives examined have included the reemployment
bonus--a lump-sum cash payment made to claimants who become reemployed quickly.
A field experiment conducted in Illinois in 1984 provided strong evidence in support of
the reemployment bonus concept. Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) reported that the offer of
a $500 reemployment bonus to Illinois UI claimants reduced the average spell of UI benefit
receipt by more than a week. Furthermore, the Illinois reemployment bonus was cost-effective
from the perspective of the UI system--for every dollar spent on bonuses in Illinois, UI benefit
payments were reduced by more than two dollars.
The Illinois findings led the U.S. Department of Labor to sponsor two additional field
experiments to further test the hypothesis that a reemployment bonus offer could significantly
reduce insured unemployment and save the UI system money. In 1988 and 1989, reemployment
bonus experiments testing a variety of reemployment bonus offers were conducted in
Pennsylvania and Washington.2 Evaluations of the separate experiments indicated that
reemployment bonuses reduced the amount of time spent on UI, thereby reducing benefit
payments. However, for all but one of the ten bonus offers tested in Pennsylvania and
Washington, the amount of bonus payments plus the administrative costs associated with making
the offers exceeded the savings in UI payments. The Pennsylvania and Washington findings stand
in sharp contrast to those from Illinois and suggest that reemployment bonuses are not costeffective from the perspective of the UI system.
To better understand how a bonus offer affects unemployment, in this paper we compare
results from Pennsylvania and Washington experiments while controlling for the observable ways
in which the experiments differed. We extend the previous research on reemployment bonuses
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Burtless (1990) summarizes the literature on the disincentives inherent in the UI system. Meyer (1990) and Moffitt
(1985) investigate the empirical impact of the UI system on unemployment spells.
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See Corson et al. (1992) and Spiegelman, O'Leary and Kline (1992).
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by examining the UI receipt and earnings of a combined sample of claimants from both the
Pennsylvania and Washington experiments. By pooling the two data sets and using a consistent
framework to evaluate both experiments, we determine with greater certainty the extent to which
the reemployment bonuses can affect economic outcomes. We also use the findings from the
merged sample to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the benefits and costs associated with
a reemployment bonus program.
II.

THE DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENTS

Both the Pennsylvania and the Washington experiments tested several alternative bonus
offers, which differed according to the amount of the offer and the period for which an individual
qualified for the bonus. The various bonus offers that were chosen encompassed the majority of
the policy-relevant reemployment bonus options. In both experiments, eligible claimants were
assigned randomly to one of the treatment groups that received the bonus offers or to a control
group that was not offered a bonus.3 Both experiments incorporated similar bonus claims
processes whereby claimants filed for the bonus payment once they fulfilled the eligibility
requirements.
The Pennsylvania experiment tested four different bonus offers based on two alternative
bonus amounts and two alternative qualification periods (Table 1). The two bonus amounts
included a low amount, which was set at three times the claimant's UI weekly benefit amount
(WBA), and a high amount, set at six times the claimant's WBA. The two qualification periods
tested included a short period of 6 weeks and a long period of 12 weeks, beginning on the bonus
offer date.4
The Washington experiment tested six different bonus offers based on three alternative
bonus amounts and two alternative qualification periods. As in the Pennsylvania experiment, the
three bonus amounts in Washington were tied to the claimant's weekly benefit amount (WBA).
A low bonus offer equal to two times the claimant's WBA, a medium offer equal to four times
the claimant's WBA, and a high offer equal to six times the claimant's WBA were made. The
two qualification periods were tied to the claimant's potential UI duration. A short qualification
3

Random assignment provides that in the absence of the experiment the outcomes for the control group members
should be similar to those for the treatment group members. Hence, any difference in behavior between the two groups
can be attributed directly to the treatment.
4

The Pennsylvania design also included fifth and sixth treatments. The fifth treatment tested a bonus offer that
declined gradually from the high amount over a 12-week qualification period, thus giving claimants an incentive to
become reemployed as quickly as possible within the 12-week period. Since this bonus offer was dissimilar to any other
Pennsylvania or Washington bonus offer, we excluded the declining bonus treatment from the pooled analysis. The sixth
Pennsylvania treatment was identical to the fourth treatment, except it excluded the offer of a job-search workshop that
accompanied all of the other treatments. However, so few claimants participated in the workshop that there was
effectively no difference between the groups, and, consequently, we combined the groups into a new group for this
analysis called treatment 4.
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period equal to 20 percent of the claimant's potential UI duration plus one week, and a long
qualification period equal to 40 percent of the claimant's potential UI duration plus one week were
offered.
The Pennsylvania and Washington experiments tested similar bonus offers. Indeed, some
of the individual treatments in the two experiments were almost identical. In particular, the short
qualification period-high bonus offer and long qualification period-high bonus offer treatments
were nearly identical across the two experiments.
III.

THE POOLED PENNSYLVANIA AND WASHINGTON SAMPLE

To control for differences in the design and economic context of the two experiments, data
from the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments were pooled to estimate treatment effects.
This pooling of data also provided added precision in estimating impacts of the bonus offers.
1. Forming the Pooled Sample
Our strategy to adjust for differences across the experiments in estimating treatment
impacts was first to combine the samples and then use a regression model that contained control
variables to account for observable differences between the samples. The main differences
between the experiments that affected the samples were the types of claimants eligible for bonus
offers and the timing of the offers. Claimants who were waiting to be recalled to their previous
job within 60 days or who were members of full referral unions were excluded from the
Pennsylvania experiment but included for the Washington experiment. In addition, the bonus
offer in Pennsylvania was made only after the waiting week or first payment was claimed, while
the offer in Washington was made when claimants applied for benefits. These differences
between the experiments suggest that the claimants who were sampled in the two experiments may
have also differed.
In pooling the claimant samples from the two experiments, our objective was to make the
samples as comparable as possible without excluding a large number of claimants. If we simply
excluded from the pooled sample those Washington claimants who did not meet the Pennsylvania
eligibility criteria, we would have reduced the Washington sample by as much as 30 percent.
Even if that route were taken some of the exclusions would have been problematic, because they
would have involved choosing a sample on the basis of a variable expected to be affected by the
bonus offer. To avoid these problems, all claimants in the Washington experiment were retained
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in the pooled sample, with the idea that binary indicators would be used to control for recall
expectations and union hiring hall status in conducting the impact analysis.5
2. The Characteristics of the Samples and the States
The pooling process yielded an analysis sample of 27,616 claimants--12,082 claimants
from Pennsylvania and 15,534 from Washington. Included in this sample are 3,354 claimants
assigned to the Pennsylvania control group, and 3,082 claimants assigned to the Washington
control group. Since control group members did not receive a bonus offer, the control groups
from the two states may be used to compare the characteristics and UI outcomes of typical eligible
claimants.
Relatively minor differences existed between the control samples in the two states. In both
states, about 16 percent of the claimants were racial minorities, but in Pennsylvania the minority
claimants were primarily black, while in Washington they were distributed evenly among black,
Hispanic, and other nonwhite groups. The racial mixes among these UI claimants are generally
representative of the racial distributions for the overall populations of the two states. In addition
to the racial mix, the base-period earnings, weekly benefit amounts, and potential UI durations
of the two samples of claimants also differed. Claimants in Pennsylvania had lower base-period
earnings, but received higher weekly benefit amounts than Washington claimants. Claimants in
Washington had longer average potential durations of UI benefits, due to the 30-week maximum
duration in that state, compared with the 26-week limit for Pennsylvania.
In pooling data from the two experiments, it is also important to consider the economic
context in which the separate experiments were operated, because different economic conditions
may lead to differences in the outcomes of interest. Pennsylvania had a lower unemployment rate
(5.1 percent in 1988), but a relatively modest rate of employment growth (1.9 percent between
1988 and 1989). In contrast, Washington had a slightly higher unemployment rate (6.2 percent
in 1989), but a much higher rate of employment growth (6.8 percent between 1988 and 1989).
Although one cannot determine conclusively which state had more favorable economic conditions
based on these statistics, it does appear that the Washington economy was expanding more rapidly
during the experiment.
The distributions of employment by industry were similar in the two states; Pennsylvania
had a slightly greater percentage in manufacturing, and Washington a larger share in wholesale
and retail trade. Earnings in UI-covered employment and the proportion of the population on
public assistance were nearly identical in the two states.

5

We did not include a binary indicator for waiting week because, by definition, this variable would have depended
on the outcome of interest. The alternate approach of excluding 30 percent of the Washington sample was tested. The
resulting estimates were similar to estimates derived while using the full sample with binary indicators to control for
stand-by or union hiring hall status.
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Enrollment sites for the experiment in Pennsylvania handled 20 percent of all UI claims
activity, while those in Washington handled 84 percent of that state's total. This difference is due
in part to differences in the number of sites in which each experiment operated--12 sites in
Pennsylvania compared to 21 sites in Washington. Nonetheless, each sample was representative
of its state's racial and industrial employment mix. Additionally, despite the moderate coverage
of state UI activity in the Pennsylvania experiment, Corson et al. (1992) report that the insured
population in the experiment sites was representative of the statewide insured population,
according to a wide variety of characteristics.
In the regression models used to estimate treatment impacts, we controlled directly for
several personal characteristics, including gender, age, race, industry of previous employment,
and earnings prior to the UI spell. We also controlled for each individual's UI parameters by
including the UI weekly benefit amount and potential UI duration in the regressions. Finally, we
controlled indirectly for economic conditions by including indicators for the site and time at which
claimants entered the experiment. The inclusion of these indicators controlled for variations in
mean outcomes across sites (and states) and across time, which were due at least in part to
differences in the economic conditions at different sites (and states) and across time.
IV.

IMPACTS ON RECEIPT OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS

We used three measures of UI benefit receipt for our analysis of the impact of the
treatments on UI receipt: (1) the number of weeks for which each claimant was paid benefits in
the benefit year, (2) the dollar amount of UI benefits paid to claimants in the benefit year, and
(3) whether claimants exhausted their benefits. Our regression model for estimating the impacts
of the individual bonus offers on UI receipt contained binary indicators for each of the 10
treatments in the experiments. The regressions also contained variables to control for the
individual characteristics of claimants, the timing of sample selection, and the UI office to which
claimants reported.
Before considering the estimated treatment impacts, we should note that within the
separate experiments, the control group in Pennsylvania collected UI longer and received more
benefits than the control group in Washington. The bottom two rows in Table 2 show that the
control group in the Pennsylvania experiment received an average of nearly 15 weeks of benefits,
which was approximately 5 percent more in benefits than the Washington control group members,
who received an average of 14.3 weeks of benefits. The differences in dollars of UI receipt were
even larger: Pennsylvania control group members received an average of $2,387, compared with
an average of $2,060 for Washington control group members--a difference of approximately 15
percent. Pennsylvania control group members were also more likely to exhaust their benefits-27.7 percent of the Pennsylvania control group members were exhaustees, compared with 23.9
percent of the Washington control group members.
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The differences in mean UI receipt between the control groups are at least partly
attributable to control-group differences in average UI weekly benefit amounts and potential UI
durations. Average weekly benefit amount among the Pennsylvania control group was $14
greater than the average weekly benefit amount among the Washington control group, which
partly explains why Pennsylvania claimants collected more UI dollars than Washington claimants.
The difference in potential UI duration, which was one week less among Pennsylvania claimants
than among Washington claimants, also probably contributed to the higher rate of benefit
exhaustion among Pennsylvania claimants. Other things being equal, we would expect that a
claimant whose potential UI duration is short would be more likely to exhaust his or her allotment
of benefits than would a claimant whose potential UI duration is longer.6
Our estimates, which are presented in Table 2, demonstrate that the bonus offers generally
reduced UI receipt in both experiments. The average impact of the bonus offers was a reduction
in UI receipt of half a week, or $85, per claimant. These estimates are significant at the 99
percent confidence level. The largest impacts were estimated for the most generous bonus offers
with the longest qualification periods--PT4 reduced UI receipt by 0.84 weeks or $133, and WT6
reduced UI receipt by 0.80 weeks or $146.7
The other treatments, whose bonus amounts and durations were more limited than those
in either PT4 or WT6, generated smaller impacts on UI receipt. The estimated reductions in
weeks of UI receipt generated by the other bonus offers ranged from 0.04 weeks for WT1 (low
bonus/short qualification period) to 0.63 weeks for PT1 (low bonus/short qualification period)
and 0.71 weeks for WT3 (high bonus/short qualification period). When measured in dollars of
benefits, the impacts of the more limited bonus offers were again less than the impacts of the most
generous bonus offers, ranging from an estimated $24 increase in UI receipt for WT1 (low
bonus/short qualification period) to an estimated $118 reduction in UI receipt for WT3 (high
bonus/short qualification period). The findings for treatments PT1 and WT4 are somewhat
anomalous because they imply that two of the smallest-amount bonus offers had relatively large
impacts, reducing UI receipt by 0.63 weeks and 0.59 weeks (or by $100 and $116), respectively.
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Two other factors contributed to greater UI receipt among Pennsylvania claimants. First, as we noted in Section
III, the Pennsylvania economy was expanding less rapidly than the Washington economy during the experiments.
Consequently, Pennsylvania claimants may have had fewer reemploymentopportunities and therefore stayed on UI longer
than did Washington claimants. Second, differences in the eligibility criteria may also have contributed to the differences
in UI receipt. For example, the Pennsylvania experiment excluded claimants who expected to be recalled to their
previous job within 60 days, while such claimants were included in the Washington experiment. These claimants were
likely to return to work quickly and therefore receive less UI benefits than other claimants. The inclusion of these
claimants in the Washington experiment drives down average UI receipt among the Washington sample relative to the
Pennsylvania sample. Using regressions to explain UI receipt enabled us to control for these and other less obvious
differences in generating our impact estimates.
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For brevity, Pennsylvania treatment 4 is referred to as PT4 and Washington treatment 6 is referred to as WT6, and
so forth.
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The estimated average impact of the bonus offers on UI benefit exhaustion was a one
percentage-point reduction in the proportion exhausting, but the estimate is not statistically
significant at the 90 percent level. The largest impact on exhaustion occurred in response to WT4
(low bonus/long qualification period), which reduced exhaustion by an estimated 3.2 percentage
points. Three other Washington bonus offers, WT3, WT5, and WT6, reduced exhaustion by
more than a single percentage point, but only the impact for WT5 (medium bonus/long
qualification period) is significant at the 90 percent confidence level. For the Pennsylvania
experiment, only PT4 (high bonus/long qualification period) appears to have reduced benefit
exhaustion, although even that estimate is not statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence
level.
Overall, our findings on UI receipt suggest that the more generous bonus offers generated
larger impacts on UI receipt than did the less generous bonus offers. Based on this finding, we
grouped the treatments and found that the average impact of treatments PT4 and WT6--the most
generous bonus offers--on weeks of UI receipt was significantly greater than the average impact
of the other bonus offers. The estimates demonstrate that the impact of PT4 and WT6, which
reduced average UI receipt by 0.82 weeks, was about double the impact of the other eight bonus
offers, which reduced average UI receipt by 0.41 weeks. The difference between the two
estimates is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. This difference
demonstrates that, on average, limiting the bonus offer by shortening the qualification period or
by reducing the bonus amount significantly limited the impact of the bonus offer on UI receipt.
Although the Pennsylvania and Washington bonuses tended to reduce average UI receipt,
the impacts were not as large as the estimated impact of the initial reemployment bonus test--the
Illinois Claimant Experiment. In the Illinois experiment, the $500, 11-week bonus offer
generated a reduction in average UI receipt of 1.15 weeks (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987).
This impact is substantially larger than the impact of even the most generous bonus offers in
Pennsylvania and Washington which averaged about double the amount offered in Illinois. The
magnitude and the consistency of the impacts on UI receipt in Pennsylvania and Washington
therefore suggest that reemployment bonuses are probably not as potent in reducing UI receipt
as was first indicated by the Illinois experiment.
V.

IMPACTS ON EARNINGS

Since claimants reduced UI receipt in response to the reemployment bonus offers, we also
expected to observe an increase in postapplication earnings for those offered a bonus. Given that
both experiments specified bonuses be paid only to claimants who found reemployment, the bonus
offers should have reduced UI receipt because they induced claimants to become reemployed more
quickly. If claimants who received bonus offers became reemployed more quickly, it is likely
that they also had greater earnings following their initial UI claim. However, earnings might not
be higher among the bonus offer recipients if the reduction in weeks of UI compensation was
spent out of the labor force instead of at work, or if the bonus offer induced claimants to accept
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reemployment at lower wages. In this section, we examine earnings during the year following
claimants' benefit application to determine if and how the bonus offer affected earnings.
Our analysis of impacts of the bonus offers on earnings is based on quarterly earnings of
claimants derived from the state UI wage records. These records, which are organized by
calendar quarter, were used because it is the best source of comparable earnings data for both
experiments.8 We examine earnings in four quarters, beginning with the quarter of benefit
application.9 Although earnings data for the first quarter partly reflect claimants' experience with
pre-UI employers, random assignment implies that pre-UI earnings during this quarter should not
vary significantly across treatment groups within each experiment. Hence, any significant crossgroup differences in earnings in the quarter of benefit application should be attributable to the
impact of the treatment on postapplication earnings.
In the absence of a reemployment bonus, the control group claimants in Washington
received greater earnings after benefit application than did the control group claimants in
Pennsylvania. Table 3 shows that, during the four-quarter period of observation, Washington
control group members received an average of about $12,000, while Pennsylvania control group
members received only about $9,300 over the comparable period. Two factors explain the
differential earnings of the control groups in the two experiments. First, on average, the
Washington claimants were more highly paid than the Pennsylvania claimants before their
respective layoffs. We would expect that this difference in earnings would remain as claimants
in both states became reemployed. Second, Washington claimants became reemployed more
quickly than Pennsylvania claimants.
The treatments appear not to have increased the earnings of claimants significantly. Over
the entire period of observation, treatment group members in the two experiments received an
average of only $7 more in earnings than did control group members, as shown in the bottom
right-hand corner of Table 3. The estimated impacts of individual treatments on earnings were
generally modest, both in each quarter and over the entire observation period, and many of these
estimated impacts were negative rather than positive. The impacts of the most generous bonus
offers on earnings were more positive than the impacts of the less generous offers, but the
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Interview data on earnings were also available for the Pennsylvania experiment, but not for the Washington
experiment. Corson et al. (1992), used both wage records and interview data to investigate earnings in the Pennsylvania
experiment, and found that wage records alone provide adequate information for evaluating the impacts of the bonus
offers on earnings.
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A potential problem with the wage records arises because earnings data organized by calendar quarter cannot be used
to isolate the impacts that occurred immediately after the benefit application date. This inflexibility may be important,
because previous studies of a reemployment bonus in the New Jersey UI Reemployment Bonus Experiment (Corson et
al. 1989) showed that the impact of the bonus offer occurred soon after benefit application. In our analysis we address
this potential problem by reporting estimates for the quarter in which claimants applied for benefits, which encompasses
the period immediately after benefit application. Corson and Decker (1990) discuss other potential problems with using
UI wage records to estimate earnings impacts.
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estimated impacts for even the most generous bonus offers were not significantly greater than
zero.
Despite the lack of significantly positive earnings impacts, the estimates are not
inconsistent with the UI impacts discussed in the previous section. For example, assuming that
the 0.51 week reduction in UI receipt for the mean bonus offer translates directly into a 0.51
week increase in employment, the expected impact on earnings is $145 per claimant. This
estimate is clearly within the 95 percent confidence interval of the estimated combined treatment
effect on earnings presented in Table 3.10
Although our sample was large and our estimates relatively precise, the estimates are not
precise enough to detect an earnings impact that is consistent with the estimated UI impacts. For
example, given the standard errors in Table 3, the combined treatment effect would have to be
equal to about $200 per claimant to be statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
This is higher than the $145 impact which is predicted based on the estimated UI impacts. For
individual treatments, even a substantial positive impact on earnings, such as the $300 increase
in earnings that we estimated for WT6 (high bonus/long qualification period), does not differ
significantly from zero given the standard errors associated with our estimates. Hence, although
our sample sizes are large and our estimate relatively precisely estimated, the standard errors of
these estimates are still too large detect the modest impacts on earnings that were likely to have
occurred in the experiments.
VI.

NET BENEFITS OF A REEMPLOYMENT BONUS OFFER

To guide policy makers in applying the results of our analysis and to help summarize the
findings, this section presents a comprehensive analysis of the net benefits of a reemployment
bonus in the UI program. In Table 4, we present estimates of the net benefits for each of the
bonus offers in the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments and for the combined bonus offers
in the two experiments. We analyze net benefits from the perspective of claimants, the UI trust
funds, the government as a whole, and society as a whole. The computation of net benefits is
based on the estimated impacts on UI receipt and earnings that are presented in Tables 2 and 3,
receipt of bonus payments, administrative costs of the bonus programs, and empirical fringe
benefit and tax rates.11
The bonus offers generally yield modest net benefits for claimants. Net benefits for
claimants of the combined treatments are equal to $14 per claimant, as shown at the bottom of
Table 4. The net benefits for claimants arise because the amount paid out to claimants in
10

Multiplying 0.51 weeks times $285, which is average weekly earnings among claimants in the base period, yields
$145. From Table 3, the point estimate of $7 and the standard error of $121 give an upper bound on the 95% confidence
interval of $249.
11

Corson et al. (1992, Chapter IX) provide a detailed discussion of the benefit-cost methodology used in the paper.
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reemployment bonuses ($95 per claimant) exceeds the reduction in UI receipt ($85 per claimant),
and there was also a slight increase in average earnings. Offers with a high bonus amount (PT3,
PT4, WT3, and WT6) were more likely to yield positive net benefits for claimants than were
offers with more modest bonus amounts.
The treatments were generally not cost-effective from the perspective of the UI trust
funds. The combined treatments yield modest losses for the UI trust funds, as the costs of
administering the bonus program and paying bonuses outweighed the UI savings generated by the
bonus offers. The rest of the government received a small increase in revenue from the combined
bonus offers because of tax revenue from the increase in claimants earnings, but the increase is
so small that the government as a whole still lost net resources in response to the bonuses.
The finding that the Pennsylvania and Washington bonuses were not cost-effective
contradicts the more promising benefit-cost findings from the Illinois Claimant Experiment.
Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) demonstrate that the Illinois bonus generated UI savings equal
to more than twice the amount of the bonuses paid. The estimated net benefits of the Illinois were
equal to about $130 per claimant, compared with net costs of $25 per claimant for the
Pennsylvania and Washington bonuses. The difference in net benefits arises partly because the
Pennsylvania and Washington experiments paid a bit more in bonuses than the Illinois experiment
($95 per claimant compared with $68 per claimant). But the biggest factor in explaining the
difference in net benefits is that the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments generated smaller
reductions in UI receipt than the Illinois experiment ($85 per claimant compared with $194 per
claimant).
The net benefit findings for the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments imply, contrary
to the Illinois findings, that reemployment bonuses do not pay for themselves. Although the
Pennsylvania and Washington bonus offers caused significant reductions in UI receipt, the
reductions were not large enough to pay for the costs of administering the bonus program and
paying bonuses. Hence, the reemployment bonuses do not offer a cost-effective remedy for the
reemployment disincentives inherent in the UI system.
Several factors might cause the net benefits that would be generated by an ongoing
program to be different than those estimated for the experiments. First, bonus offers could have
different impacts in economic environments that differ from the economic environments of
Pennsylvania and Washington during the experiments. Second, some claimants who stopped
collecting UI within the bonus qualification periods in Pennsylvania and Washington did not claim
a bonus. Presumably, a greater percentage of these claimants might claim a bonus in an ongoing
program, where the bonus would be part of the regular UI system, thereby increasing the costs
of an ongoing program beyond our estimates. Third, displacement might prevent any positive
impacts on net benefits from occurring in an ongoing program. Displacement would occur if a
bonus-induced reduction in UI receipt were offset by an increase in unemployment and UI receipt
among claimants or other unemployed workers who do not receive a bonus offer. Finally, the
availability of a bonus may induce some unemployed workers, who in the absence of a bonus do
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not even apply for UI benefits, to enter the system. Although we cannot estimate the effects of
these other factors on net benefit estimates, three of the four factors would imply that the bonuses
are likely to be even more costly than is suggested by the estimates. Hence, these factors
contribute to the general conclusion that reemployment bonuses are not likely to be a costeffective policy for the UI system.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The bonus offers tested in the Pennsylvania and Washington bonus experiments had
similar impacts on average UI receipt and earnings among eligible claimants. The impacts on UI
receipt were statistically significant but relatively modest. The combined bonus offers in the two
experiments reduced UI receipt by an average of about half a week, or by $85. The average
impact of the bonus offers on earnings was extremely small (an increase of $7 per claimant) and
not statistically significant.
Since the estimated impacts on UI receipt were modest, the reemployment bonuses did not
generate the UI savings necessary to pay for administering and paying the bonuses. Hence, the
bonuses are not cost-effective from the perspective of the UI system. This finding contradicts the
earlier findings from Illinois, which indicated that a reemployment bonus in that state generated
UI savings equal to more than twice the costs of administering and paying the bonuses. Contrary
to the results from the Illinois experiment, findings from the Pennsylvania and Washington
experiments suggest that the reemployment bonus is not a cost-effective method of speeding the
reemployment of UI claimants.
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TABLE 1
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REEMPLOYMENT BONUS EXPERIMENTS

Bonus Structure

Pennsylvania Experiment

Washington Experiment

The four primary bonus offers took the following form:

Six bonus offers were tested:

Qualification Period

Eligibility Criteria

Bonus
Amount

(.2 × Potential UI
(.4 × Potential UI
Duration) + 1 Week Duration) + 1 Week

Treatment 1 (PT1) Treatment 2 (PT2)

2 × WBA

Treatment 1 (WT1)

Treatment 4 (WT4)

Treatment 3 (PT3) Treatment 4 (PT4)

4 × WBA

Treatment 2 (WT2)

Treatment 5 (WT5)

6 × WBA

Treatment 3 (WT3)

Treatment 6 (WT6)

Bonus Amount

6 Weeks

3 × WBA
6 × WBA

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Qualification Period

12 Weeks

Initial claims only
Regular UI claimants
Initial satisfied monetary eligibility conditions
Did not accept employment exclusively through a union
Did not have a specific recall date within 60 days after benefit
application
Was not separated from job due to a labor dispute
Signed for a waiting week or first payment within 6 weeks
after benefit application date

•
•
•

Initial claims only
Eligible to receive benefits from the
state UI trust fund
Monetary valid claims at the time of
filing

Delivery of Bonus Offer

Offer made to claimants when they signed for a waiting week or first
payment

Offer made at the time claimants filed for benefits.

Additional Requirements
for Receiving the Bonus

•

•

•
•
•

Additional Services
Offered

16 weeks of continuous employment (no employment
interruption of more than one week).
Did not claim UI benefits during the reemployment
period.
Employment at bonus-qualifying job averaged 32 or
more hours per week.
Maintained monetary and nonmonetary UI eligibility
up to the point of reemployment.

Voluntary job-search workshop

•
•
•

None

4 months of continuous employment
(no employment interruption of more
than one week)
Did not claim UI benefits during the
reemployment period.
Employment at bonus-qualifying job
averaged 34 or more hours per week.
No separation issue in the initial UI
claim that prevented UI benefit
payments during the bonus
qualification period.
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TABLE 2
THE ESTIMATED IMPACTS OF THE TREATMENTS ON UI OUTCOMES
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
UI Outcome
Weeks of Benefits
Received in Benefit
Year
Pennsylvania Treatments
PT1 - Low bonus, short
qualification period
PT2 - Low bonus, long
qualification period
PT3 - High bonus, short
qualification period
PT4 - High bonus, long
qualification period
Washington Treatments
WT1 - Low bonus, short
qualification period
WT2 - Medium bonus, short
qualification period
WT3 - High bonus, short
qualification period
WT4 - Low bonus, long
qualification period
WT5 - Medium bonus, long
qualification period
WT6 - High bonus, long
qualification period
Combined Treatments
Combined Control Group Mean
Pennsylvania Control Group Mean
Washington Control Group Mean
NOTE:

Dollars of Benefits
Received in Benefit
Year

Rate of Benefit
Exhaustion
(percent)

Sample Size

-.63 *
(.34)
-.39
(.28)
-.46
(.30)
-.84 ***
(.26)

-100 *
(55)
-73
(46)
-99 **
(50)
-133 ***
(43)

0.2
(1.4)
0.1
(1.1)
0.1
(1.2)
-1.6
(1.1)

1,385

-.04
(.29)
-.25
(.29)
-.71**
(.32)
-.59**
(.29)
-.31
(.29)
-.80**
(.33)
-.51***
(.15)

24
(48)
-32
(47)
-118**
(53)
-116**
(47)
-52
(47)
-146 ***
(54)
-85 ***
(25)

0.8
(1.2)
-0.5
(1.2)
-1.6
(1.3)
-3.2 ***
(1.2)
-2.0 *
(1.2)
-2.1
(1.3)
-1.0
(0.6)

2,246

14.63
14.94
14.30

2,223
2,387
2,060

25.9
27.7
23.9

2,428
1,885
3,030

2,348
1,583
2,387
2,353
1,535
21,180
6,436
3,354
3,082

Estimates are regression-adjusted. The sample includes 27,616 observations for whom we have data on both
demographic characteristics and UI receipt. The explanatory variables in the regression include treatment
indicators, cohort indicators, office indicators, the weekly benefit amount, entitled duration of benefits, base
period wages, and dummy variables for union hiring hall membership, stand-by status, female, black,
hispanic, other non-white race, age less than 35, age greater than 54, manufacturing, and industry code
missing.

* Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
** Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
*** Statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
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TABLE 3
THE ESTIMATED IMPACTS OF THE TREATMENTS ON DOLLARS OF EARNINGS
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Period of Observationa

Pennsylvania Treatments
PT1 - Low bonus, short
qualification period
PT2 - Low bonus, long
qualification period
PT3 - High bonus, short
qualification period
PT4 - High bonus, long
qualification period
Washington Treatments
WT1 - Low bonus, short
qualification period
WT2 - Medium bonus, short
qualification period
WT3 - High bonus, short
qualification period
WT4 - Low bonus, long
qualification period
WT5 - Medium bonus, long
qualification period
WT6 - High bonus, long
qualification period
Combined Treatments
Combined Control Group Mean
Pennsylvania Control Group Mean
Washington Control Group Mean

Quarter of
Benefit Application

Quarter
1

Quarter
2

Quarter
3

Sample
Size

-.20
(103)
117
(86)
-19
(92)
-32
(81)

19
(98)
87
(81)
116
(88)
70
(77)

-89
(96)
-25
(80)
-11
(86)
81
(75)

-199 **
(97)
-14
(81)
56
(87)
53
(76)

-289
(272)
165
(226)
141
(244)
171
(214)

11
(89)
-36
(88)
-24
(100)
-74
(88)
-98
(88)
-134
(101)
-22
(46)

-178 **
(85)
-54
(84)
63
(94)
36
(83)
-42
(83)
102
(95)
26
(44)

-60
(83)
-143 *
(82)
-19
(93)
-138 *
(82)
-70
(82)
143
(94)
-29
(43)

1
(84)
100
(83)
176 *
(94)
-9
(83)
24
(83)
189 **
(95)
31
(43)

-226
(236)
-134
(232)
196
(262)
-186
(232)
-186
(232)
300
(265)
7
(121)

$2,844
$2,649
$3,058

$2,119
$1,698
$2,581

$2,719
$2,351
$3,121

$2,922
$2,605
$3,270

$10,605
$9,303
$12,031

NOTE: The sample includes 27,549 observations for whom we have data on both demographic characteristics and
earnings. We excluded observations with earnings greater than $100,000 in any quarter. The explanatory variables in
the regression include treatment indicators, cohort indicators, office indicators, the weekly benefit amount, entitled
duration of benefits, base period wages, and dummy variables for union hiring hall membership, stand-by status, female,
black, hispanic, other non-white race, age less than 35, age greater than 54, manufacturing, and industry code missing.
a
Quarters 1, 2, and 3 are the first, second, and third full calendar quarters after benefit application.
* Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
** Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATED NET BENEFITS
(Dollars per Claimant)
Perspective
Government
Claimant

UI Trust Fund

Government Total

Society

Pennsylvania Treatments
PT1 -

Low bonus, short
qualification period

-312

41

-53

-365

PT2 -

Low bonus, long
qualification period

142

-1

42

184

PT3 -

High bonus, short
qualification period

127

-10

28

155

PT4 -

High bonus, long
qualification period

171

-31

20

191

-168

-71

-122

-289

WT2 - Medium bonus, short
qualification period

-87

-65

-91

-178

WT3 - High bonus, short
qualification period

198

-37

23

222

WT4 - Low bonus, long
qualification period

-224

51

-16

-241

WT5 - Medium bonus, long
qualification period

-124

-79

-117

-241

WT6 - High bonus, long
qualification period

328

-80

19

347

14

-25

-21

-7

Washington Treatments
WT1 - Low bonus, short
qualification period

Combined Treatments
NOTE:

The estimated benefits and costs of the bonus offers are based on the estimated impacts on UI receipt and
earnings presented in Tables 2 and 3 and the bonus and administrative costs described in Spiegeleman,
O'Leary, and Kline (1992) and Corson et al. (1992).

